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Draft of 25 November 2016 
 
Goodbye EU Anti-Discrimination Law? 




'Don't it always seem to go 
That you don't know what you've got 




On 5 October 2016, Theresa May outlined her vision of the United Kingdom's future outside 
the European Union:2   
Our laws made not in Brussels but in Westminster. Our judges sitting not in 
Luxembourg but in courts across the land.  The authority of EU law in this 
country ended forever. ... [W]e are not leaving only to return to the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Justice. ... We are leaving to become, once more, a fully 
sovereign and independent country.3 
 
Will being 'a fully sovereign and independent country', free of EU anti-discrimination law 
and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), be a good thing for the UK's women and 
minorities (defined by race, religion, disability, age or sexual orientation)?  Would fewer 
women and members of minorities have voted to leave the EU, if they had understood the 
potential consequences for UK anti-discrimination law?  In theory, the Equality Act 2010 for 
Great Britain (and similar legislation for Northern Ireland) provides all the protection against 
discrimination we need, because it meets the minimum requirements of EU law and goes 
beyond them in some areas.  But can Theresa May and her successors be trusted to maintain 
this protection, once the UK Parliament is freed of the constraints of EU law? 
                                                 
Professor of Human Rights Law, King’s College London.   
1 Joni Mitchell, "Big Yellow Taxi", 1970, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=94bdMSCdw20 (last accessed 25 
November 2016).  
2 I do not use the term ‘Brexit’, which implies misleadingly that the UK’s leaving the EU is a quick, simple and 
cost-free process, like walking through a door or turning off the motorway.  A better term would be ‘Brivorce’, 
which implies accurately that the process is likely to be long, complicated and expensive. 
3 See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-speech-tory-conference-2016-in-full-
transcript-a7346171.html (last accessed 25 November 2016).  
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 This might be the case, given that she described the Conservative Party in the same 
speech as 'the party of workers', which will make sure that 'people are properly protected at 
work'.  She added that she wants the UK to be 'a Great Meritocracy', 'a country where it 
doesn’t matter where you were born, who your parents are, where you went to school, what 
your accent sounds like, what god you worship, whether you’re a man or a woman, gay or 
straight, or black or white'.  She expressed concern about disproportionate exclusion of black 
Caribbean schoolchildren, detention of black women under mental health legislation, and 
poverty in ethnic minority households, as well as the fact that white working class boys are 
the group least likely to go to university.4  
 But what if the historical ambivalence of the Conservative Party with regard to anti-
discrimination legislation were to resurface, and inspire a ‘Great Repeal Bill’ to sweep away 
the Equality Act 2010 and other legislation seen as burdening UK businesses?  What would 
we lose, because EU law would no longer prevent this from happening?  Heeding Joni 
Mitchell's warning, we should know what we’ve got, ie, what EU anti-discrimination law has 
done for women and minorities in the UK, before it's gone. 
II.  How has EU law strengthened UK anti-discrimination law? 
Since the UK joined the EU in 1973, EU legislation and CJEU judgments (interpreting EU 
legislation) have frequently required improvements to UK anti-discrimination law, both with 
regard to grounds introduced into UK law before EU law (race in 1965, sex in areas beyond 
pay in 1975, disability in 1995),5 and grounds introduced into UK law after EU law, to 
implement Directives adopted in 20006 (religion, age, and sexual orientation).7 
                                                 
4 Ibid.  But see https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/nov/07/doubts-cast-on-theresa-mays-pledge-to-protect-
workers-rights-post-brexit ((last accessed 25 November 2016).  
5 Race Relations Acts 1965, 1968, 1976; Equal Pay Act 1970 and Sex Discrimination Act 1975; Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995. The legislation cited in this article often applies only to Great Britain (England, 
Wales, and Scotland).  When this is the case, there is separate legislation for Northern Ireland. 
6 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, Official Journal L 180 (19 July 2000), p. 22. Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, Official Journal L 303 (2 Dec. 2000), p. 16. 
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A.  Equal pay 
The Equal Pay Act 1970 (equal pay for men and women for ‘like work’ or ‘work rated as 
equivalent’) was partly inspired by the eventual need to comply with Article 119 of the 1957 
EEC Treaty (‘the principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work’, 
now found in Article 157 TFEU), after the UK’s accession to the EU in 1973.  In 1975, 
Directive 75/117/EEC extended the meaning of ‘equal work’ to include not only ‘the same 
work’ but also ‘work to which equal value is attributed’.  The Equal Pay Act 1970 was 
therefore amended in 1983 to add the concept of work that is, ‘in terms of the demands made 
on [a woman] (for instance under such headings as effort, skill and decision), of equal value 
to that of a man’.8      
B.  Equal treatment:  Sex, pregnancy, and sexual harassment 
In the area of ‘equal treatment’ in employment (as opposed to ‘equal pay’ in employment), 
the UK’s Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA) prohibited direct and indirect sex 
discrimination with regard to access to employment (hiring or promotion), dismissal, and 
working conditions (other than pay), before the EU’s Directive 76/207/EEC did so in 1976.  
However, because EU law allowed women in the UK to request references to the CJEU, they 
could challenge restrictions in UK legislation that limited their protection against sex 
discrimination.  In Marshall No. 1,9 the CJEU held that Directive 76/207/EEC did not permit 
the SDA’s exception for retirement, which allowed employers to dismiss women at the age of 
60, even though they let men work until they were 65.10   In Marshall No. 2, the CJEU went 
on to rule that the SDA’s upper limit of £6250 on damages ‘cannot … constitute proper 
implementation of … the Directive, since it limits … compensation … to a level which is not 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003; Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003; Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006. 
8 Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983. 
9 Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1986] ECR 723. 
10 The application of the exception to dismissal was removed by the Sex Discrimination Act 1986, s. 2. 
4 
 
necessarily consistent with … ensuring real equality of opportunity through adequate 
reparation for the loss … sustained as a result of discriminatory dismissal’.11 
 As for pregnant women, UK courts failed to protect them adequately against 
dismissals [PLURAL] or refusals to hire or promote them,12 until the CJEU declared in 
Dekker in 1990 that ‘only women can be refused employment on grounds of pregnancy and 
such a refusal therefore constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex’.13  In Webb, the 
CJEU curtly dismissed the UK House of Lords’ suggestion that a pregnant woman could be 
compared with an ill man,14 and later extended protection against dismissal from pregnant 
women hired for an indefinite period (Webb) to pregnant women employed on a series of 
fixed-term contracts.15  The CJEU also interpreted Directive 76/207/EEC in Brown as 
prohibiting dismissal due to pregnancy-related illness prior to maternity leave, no matter how 
long the illness lasts.16  When the UK Government complied with Dekker, by ending its 
policy of dismissing female members of the armed forces when they became pregnant, 
Marshall No. 2 allowed women who had been dismissed to claim substantial compensation.17  
Two further examples of how EU law has strengthened UK law against sex 
discrimination are the areas of sexual harassment and positive action.  Until 2005, UK law 
contained no express definition or prohibition of sexual harassment, which had to be 
characterised as direct sex discrimination, and required a showing that a male comparator 
would not have been treated in the same way.18  A definition and an express prohibition were 
added to the SDA in 2005 to implement Directive 2002/73/EC.19  Similarly, before the 
                                                 
11 Case C-271/91 Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority [1993] ECR I-
4367, [30]. 
12 See, eg, Turley v. Allders Department Stores, [1980] ICR 66 (EAT). 
13 Case C-177/88, Dekker, [1990] ECR I-3941, [12].  
14 Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (No. 1), [1992] 4 All ER 929 (HL); Case C-32/93, Webb v. EMO Air Cargo, [1994] 
ECR I-3567; Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (No. 2), [1995] 4 All ER 577 (HL). 
15 Case C-109/00, Tele Danmark A/S v. Brandt-Nielsen, [2001] ECR I-6993 
16 Case C-394/96, Brown v. Rentokil, [1998] ECR I-4185. 
17 Ministry of Defence v Cannock, Employment Appeal Tribunal, 2 August 1994. 
18 Pearce v Mayfield Secondary School, [2003] UKHL 34. 
19 Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005. 
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Equality Act 2010, anti-discrimination legislation in Great Britain expressly outlawed 
positive action that takes the form of preferences for women or a minority in decisions about 
recruitment or promotion.20  Influenced by EU law, the 2010 Act departs from this long UK 
tradition by allowing consideration of sex, race and other grounds in ‘tie-breaking’ situations, 
where two candidates for employment are equally well qualified and one is from an under-
represented group,21 as the CJEU has done with regard to sex since 1997.22    
C.  Gender reassignment 
When a transgender woman was dismissed for undergoing gender reassignment, the 
Industrial Tribunal saw no prospect of protection under the SDA, but referred the question of 
protection under Directive 76/207/EEC to the Luxembourg Court.  In 1996, the CJEU ruled 
in her favour, finding that the Directive’s prohibition of sex discrimination ‘precludes 
dismissal of a transsexual for a reason related to a gender reassignment’.23  Although it was 
not necessary to amend the SDA, only to interpret it in light of the CJEU’s judgment, the UK 
chose to add the ground ‘gender reassignment’ to the SDA in 1999.24  The CJEU provided 
further protection with regard to a survivor’s pension, before the Gender Recognition Act 
2004 allowed a non-transgender female employee to marry her transgender male partner 
(they were both legally female at the time),25 and with regard to a state pension, before the 
2004 Act allowed a transgender woman to apply for a gender recognition certificate and 
qualify at the age of 60.26  Most recently, the UK Supreme Court has sought the assistance of 
the CJEU in deciding whether or not a transgender woman may be required to divorce her 
                                                 
20 Londo n Borough of Lambeth v. Commission for Racial Equality,[1990] IRLR 231 (EWCA); Jepson v. The 
Labour Party, [1996] IRLR 116 (IT). 
21 Equality Act 2010, ss. 159(3)-(4). 
22 C-409/95, Marschall v Land Nordrhein Westfalen, [1997] ECR I-6363. 
23 Case C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, [1996] ECR I-2143, para 24. 
24 Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999. 
25 Case C-117/01, K.B. v. National Health Service Pensions Agency, [2004] ECR I-541. 
26 Case C-423/04, Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, [2006] ECR I-3585. 
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wife and form a civil partnership with her, as the 2004 Act required before the Marriage 
(Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, in order to qualify for a state pension at the age of 60.27 
D.  Sexual orientation 
Although the CJEU declined in Grant in 1998 to interpret Directive 76/207/EEC on sex 
discrimination as protecting lesbian, gay and bisexual employees,28 in the same way as it 
protects transgender employees, the European Commission and the Council of the EU came 
to the rescue.  In late 1999, shortly after the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, they 
quickly exercised the new EU competence to combat discrimination based on sexual 
orientation (Article 13 TEC, inserted in 1997, now Article 19 TFEU), by proposing and 
adopting (unanimously as required by Article 13) Directive 2000/78/EC, which expressly 
prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment and vocational training.  
The EU introduced this binding legislation (which the UK Government chose not to veto) at a 
time when the UK Government had been proposing, within the UK, only non-binding codes 
of practice for discrimination based on sexual orientation and age, instead of new legislation 
similar to the SDA.29 
 In 2005, while preparing for the coming into force of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 
on 5 December 2005, the UK Government inserted into the Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2003 an exception to the principle that less favourable treatment of 
same-sex civil partners, compared with different-sex spouses, would be direct discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.  The exception, which is now found in the Equality Act 2010 
(Schedule 9, Paragraph 18), permits occupational pension schemes (especially those in the 
private sector) to ignore contributions to the schemes made by lesbian and gay employees 
                                                 
27 C-451/16, MB v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, referred by [2016] UKSC 53. 
28 Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains, [1998] ECR I-621. 
29 See Written Answers (HL), 2 December 1999, Column WA51, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/vo991202/text/91202w01.htm (last accessed 25 
November 2016):  "The Government have already produced a code of practice on discrimination in employment 




before 5 December 2005, when calculating the amount of a survivor’s pension payable to a 
same-sex civil partner, even though they would give credit for identical contributions by a 
heterosexual employee with a surviving different-sex spouse.  Insult was added to injury 
when the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 extended the Paragraph 18 exception to 
same-sex spouses. 
 In adding the very mean Paragraph 18 exception to equality for same-sex couples in 
2005, the UK Government assumed that EU law would permit it.  They were wrong.  In 
Maruko in 200830 and Römer in 2011,31 the CJEU interpreted Directive 2000/78/EC as 
requiring equal pay (including pension or survivor’s pension benefits) for employees with 
same-sex civil partners and employees with different-sex spouses, even though all of the 
employee’s contributions in both cases were made before the 2003 deadline to implement the 
Directive.  Citing Maruko and Römer, John Walker, who retired in 2003, challenged his 
private-sector employer’s reliance on Paragraph 18 as permitting them (in the future) to 
refuse to pay to Mr. Walker’s then civil partner (now his husband) the same survivor’s 
pension that the employer would pay to Mr. Walker’s wife, if he were to divorce his husband 
and marry a woman.  The Employment Tribunal upheld his claim that Paragraph 18 is 
contrary to the Directive, but his employer appealed.  The UK Government intervened on the 
side of the employer to defend Paragraph 18, and helped to persuade both the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal and the England and Wales Court of Appeal to hold that Maruko and Römer 
had no effect on Paragraph 18, and that a reference to the CJEU was not necessary.32 
The UKSC is scheduled to hear Mr. Walker’s appeal on 8-9 March 2017. The UKSC 
should grant the appeal in Walker, or make a reference to the CJEU, which would almost 
certainly hold that Walker is indistinguishable from Maruko and Römer. 
                                                 
30 Case C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, [2008] ECR I-1757. 
31 Case C-147/08, Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, [2011] ECR I-3591. 
32 See R. Wintemute, ‘Unequal Same-Sex Survivor’s Pensions:  The EWCA Refuses to Apply CJEU Precedents 
or Refer’, (2016) 45 ILJ 89, analysing [2015] EWCA Civ 1000. 
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 If Mr. Walker’s claim ultimately succeeds, and EU law requires that Paragraph 18 be 
set aside, his husband’s EU law right to an equal survivor’s pension could be snatched away, 
if the UK leaves the EU while Mr. Walker and his husband are both still alive.  The UK’s 
departure would mean that Directive 2000/78/EC, as interpreted in Maruko and Römer, 
would no longer protect UK employees with same-sex surviving civil partners or spouses, 
and would therefore permit the ‘fully sovereign and independent’ UK Government to revive 
Paragraph 18.33   
E. Religion or belief 
In Northern Ireland, protection against discrimination because of ‘religious belief’ began with 
the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1976.  As of 2000, there was still no comparable 
protection in Great Britain, leaving the Roman Catholic, Hindu and Muslim minorities 
unprotected (except with regard to indirect discrimination under the Race Relations Act 1976, 
or with regard to acts of public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998 from 2 October 
2000).  As in the case of the grounds ‘gender reassignment’ and ‘sexual orientation’, it was 
only as the result of EU action that the ground ‘religion or belief’ was added to Great 
Britain’s anti-discrimination legislation, when the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003 implemented Directive 2000/78/EC. 
 To date, the CJEU has decided no cases regarding religion or belief that might raise 
standards in the UK.  With regard to the accommodation of religious minority practices, the 
UK’s standards are arguably already the highest in the EU, at least in the case of ethnic-
religious minorities (Jews and Sikhs), and religious minorities that are disproportionately 
made up of members of ethnic minorities (Hindus in the UK being disproportionately of 
Indian origin, and Muslims disproportionately of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin), and 
especially compared with those in France and Belgium.  Since the House of Lords’ landmark 
                                                 
33 Instead of being set aside under EU law, paragraph 18 might be repealed, if the UK Supreme Court makes a 
declaration of incompatibility in Walker under s. 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the UK Government 
complies with it. 
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1983 judgment in Mandla v Dowell Lee,34 discrimination against non-Christian religious 
minorities in Great Britain has generally been prohibited as indirect racial discrimination, 
with claims of direct or indirect religious discrimination being added in 2003.  
 Indeed, religion or belief is an area in which the UK could help to raise standards in 
the other 27 EU member states, were it to remain in the EU.  The potential of beneficial UK 
influence can be seen in the contrasting Opinions of the Advocates General in the first two 
religion or belief cases to reach the CJEU.  In Samira Achbita (a case from Belgium), 
Advocate General Kokott (from Germany) proposed highly deferential review of an 
employer’s ban on female Muslim employees wearing headscarves: 
1)      The fact that a female employee of Muslim faith is prohibited from wearing 
an Islamic headscarf at work does not constitute direct discrimination based on 
religion within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78/EC if that ban 
is founded on a general company rule prohibiting visible political, philosophical 
and religious symbols in the workplace and not on stereotypes or prejudice 
against one or more particular religions or against religious beliefs in general. 
That ban may, however, constitute indirect discrimination … under 
Article 2(2)(b) … 
2)      Such discrimination may be justified in order to enforce a policy of 
religious and ideological neutrality pursued by the employer in the company 
concerned, in so far as the principle of proportionality is observed in that regard. 
In that connection, the following factors in particular must be taken into account: 
–        the size and conspicuousness of the religious symbol, 
–        the nature of the employee’s activity, 
–        the context in which she has to perform that activity, and 
–        the national identity of the Member State concerned.35 
 
In Asma Bougnaoui (a case from France), Advocate General Sharpston (from the UK) 
reflects ‘headscarf-friendly and turban-friendly’ UK anti-discrimination law when she 
proposes a much more robust interpretation of EU law:   
A rule … which prohibits employees of the undertaking from wearing religious 
signs or apparel when in contact with customers of the business involves direct 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, to which neither Article 4(1) of … 
Directive 2000/78/EC … nor any of the other derogations from the prohibition of 
direct discrimination on grounds of religion or belief which that directive lays 
                                                 
34 [1983] UKHL 7. 
35 Case C‑ 157/15, Opinion of 31 May 2016. 
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down applies. That is a fortiori the case when the rule in question applies to the 
wearing of the Islamic headscarf alone.36 
 
F.  Age 
Although no judgment of the CJEU to date seems to have imposed a higher standard on the 
UK than a UK court was willing to impose, it must not be forgotten that, but for Directive 
2000/78/EC, implemented through the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, it is 
possible that a prohibition of age discrimination would still not have been introduced into UK 
anti-discrimination law.  
G.  Racial or ethnic origin 
Since the Race Relations Act 1965, and with the exception of Northern Ireland before 1997,37 
the UK has been a leader in the EU in prohibiting racial discrimination.  The detailed 
prohibitions of direct and indirect racial discrimination in the Racial Relations Act 1976 
clearly influenced the drafting of Directive 2000/43/EC, the EU’s first prohibition of racial 
discrimination.  But even here, UK legislation has benefited from EU action.  Three examples 
can be given. 
 First, the CJEU’s Marshall No. 2 judgment, which led to the removal of the cap on 
damages for sex discrimination,38 inspired the UK Government to voluntarily remove the 
identical cap on damages for racial discrimination, even though EU law did not yet apply.39  
Second, the Race Relations Act 1976 contained no definition or prohibition of harassment on 
racial grounds before Directive 2000/43/EC, which was implemented through the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003.  Third, the UK could benefit in future 
from the CJEU’s 2015 CHEZ judgment, which held: (i) that an apparently neutral rule chosen 
intentionally because it would have a disproportionate impact on a particular racial or ethnic 
group (Roma persons) is direct racial discrimination, even though it affects members of other 
                                                 
36 Case C‑ 188/15, Opinion of 13 July 2016. 
37 Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1997. 
38 Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay (Remedies) Regulations 1993. 
39 Race Relations (Remedies) Act 1994. 
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racial or ethnic groups (non-Roma persons); and (ii) an individual does not have to be a 
member of the group experiencing the intentionally or unintentionally disproportionate 
impact of an apparently neutral rule to challenge it as direct or indirect racial discrimination 
(a non-Roma woman could challenge a rule targeting or disproportionately affecting Roma 
persons because it also affected her).40       
H.  Disability 
As in the area of racial or ethnic origin, the UK led the EU with its Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 (DDA), and therefore influenced the drafting of Directive 2000/78/EC, the EU’s 
first prohibition of disability discrimination.  However, to implement the Directive, the DDA 
still had to be amended by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) Regulations 
2003 to provide a clear prohibition of direct discrimination (which could not be justified), and 
a definition and prohibition of harassment of disabled persons.  The Directive’s prohibition of 
indirect disability discrimination, which was made optional to reflect the pre-existing 
structure of the DDA, was finally incorporated into the Equality Act 2010.  As for the case 
law of the CJEU, the UK has benefited from judgments on discrimination against one person 
(a mother) because of the disability of another (her son),41 and on using the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to interpret EU law.42 
III.  Would the European Convention provide the same protection as EU law? 
If the UK leaves the EU, discrimination by public authorities can still be challenged under the 
Human Rights Act 1998, and ultimately in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  
But what about the private sector?  If the UK Government began to repeal parts of the 
Equality Act 2010, because they were no longer required by EU law, could an application to 
the ECtHR claim a breach of a positive obligation under Article 14 (and another Convention 
                                                 
40 Case C-83/14 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia [2015] ECR I-0000. 
41 Case C-303/06 Coleman v Attridge Law, [2008] ECR I-5603. 
42 Case C-335/11 HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring [2013] ECR I-0000. 
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right, such as the Article 8 right to respect for private life)43 to adopt legislation prohibiting 
certain forms of discrimination by private-sector actors?44  In Vriend v. Alberta,45 the 
Supreme Court of Canada found a positive obligation to legislate against sexual orientation 
discrimination, especially in the private sector.  Similar reasoning from the ECtHR can be 
found in Danilenkov v. Russia:46  
123. ... the totality of the measures implemented to safeguard the guarantees of 
Article 11 should include protection against discrimination on the ground of trade 
union membership ... 
136. ... the State failed to fulfil its positive obligations to adopt effective and clear 
judicial protection against discrimination on the ground of trade union 
membership. ... 
 
 But will Theresa May one day renew her 25 April 2016 proposal that the UK should 
leave the European Convention on Human Rights, thereby stripping UK residents of their 
access, not only to the CJEU, but also to the ECtHR?  She said: 
The ECHR can bind the hands of Parliament, adds nothing to our prosperity, 
makes us less secure by preventing the deportation of dangerous foreign nationals 
– and does nothing to change the attitudes of governments like Russia’s when it 
comes to human rights.  So regardless of the EU referendum, my view is this.  If 
we want to reform human rights laws in this country, it isn’t the EU we should 
leave but the ECHR and the jurisdiction of its Court.47  
 
She retracted this proposal when she launched her bid for the leadership of the Conservative 
Party on 30 June 2016:  ‘I’ve set my position on the ECHR out very clearly but I also 
recognise that this is an issue that divides people, and the reality is there will be no 
Parliamentary majority for pulling out of the ECHR, so that is something I’m not going to 
pursue [until there is one?].’48 
                                                 
43 On employment discrimination falling within the ambit of Article 8 (private life), see I.B. v. Greece (3 Oct. 
2013); Emel Boyraz v. Turkey (2 Dec. 2014). 
44 There is no reason why the reference to a potential positive obligation in the Explanatory Report to Protocol 
No. 12 (paras 26-28) should not also apply to Article 14 when the facts fall within the ambit of another 
Convention right. 
45 [1998] 1 Supreme Court Reports 493. 
46 30 July 2009. 
47 See http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2016/04/theresa-mays-speech-on-brexit-full-text.html (last 
accessed 25 November 2016).  
48 See http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2016/06/30/theresa-may-ditches-plans-to-withdraw-from-human-rights-
court-as-she-bids-to-be-pm (last accessed 25 November 2016).   
13 
 
IV.  Conclusion   
Historically, the Conservative Party has rarely proposed new UK anti-discrimination 
legislation.  The Race Relations Acts 1965, 1968 and 1976, the Equal Pay Act 1970, the 
SDA, the Regulations implementing Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC, and the 
Equality Act 2010 were all introduced by the Labour Party.  The main exception was the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995, which required direct action by disability rights 
campaigners sufficient to embarrass John Major’s Government into legislating.49  Since 2010, 
the Conservative Party (with and without the Liberal Democrats) has chosen not to bring into 
force several sections of the Equality Act 2010,50 and to repeal others.51  If the UK leaves the 
EU and the requirements of EU anti-discrimination law, it is not inconceivable that a 
business-friendly Conservative Government could one day propose the repeal of the entire 
Equality Act 2010, and its replacement by voluntary codes of practice.52  Inside the EU, the 
UK benefits from minimum anti-discrimination standards agreed by 28 countries.  EU 
membership locks in most of the protections that the UK’s women and minorities have fought 
to achieve since 1965, and prohibits regression by the UK Government and Parliament.  
Outside the EU, anything is possible.  Perhaps a slogan for the Remain campaign should have 
been, with regard to anti-discrimination law:   ‘Let’s go forward together, not backwards 
alone.’ 
 
                                                 
49 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/591HbNXpfSw1WFMkPN2fQcY/the-reunion-disability-
campaigners-full-programme-transcript-10-april-2016 (last accessed 25 November 2016).  
50 Sections 1(socio-economic inequalities), 14 (combined discrimination). 
51 Sections 40(2)-(4) (liability for third-party harassment) and 138 (questionnaire procedure), repealed by 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, ss. 65-66. 
52 See Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds 
The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Harvard University Press, 1995). 
